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The Scope of the Question
The Federal budget has been the object of criticism and contro-
versy in the past few years. Noted authors, statesmen, and public spi-
rited citizens have written much, some with an eye to correcting defi-
ciencies, others toward changing the complete system, and still others
just for the sake of comment. When one contemplates the magnitude of
the figures presented each year and the great number of activities af-
fected by this document, it is a wonder that even more hasn't been
written about it. Most Americans think only about the Federal budget
around the first of the year when it is presented to Congress. This
causes great publicity in the papers. Or again they may give it serious
thought while they are struggling with their income tax returns. Beyond
this, most people are content to let a relatively select few review and
pass on the budget, hoping in this way that the individual will be pro-
tected.
Purpose and Scope of this Thesis
But as this document has grown in the past few years, are the
few doing an adequate job? This is not to challenge their honesty or
loyalty, but do these people have the time available to do a proper job?
Can these relatively few know enough in their respective fields and areas
that are expanding year to year, to keep abreast of their particular
situation so that they may make a true and honest appraisal of figures.
1

2presented? As an interesting sidelight the Federal budget receipts have
increased from $567,000,000 in 1900 to $77,763,000,000 in I960; expendi-
tures have gone from $521,000,000 in 1900 to $76,539,000,000 in 1960.
The public debt in 1900 was $1,263,000,000 and in 1960 this figure climbed
to $286,331,000,000. l To amplify this extremely complicated situation,
the following excerpt from an article, in the New York Times published on
the day after the latest budget was presented to Congress....
...the 1962 budget weighs four pounds six ounces in the paper
back edition. The main plot is simple enough: how to live on $81
billion a year. But what gives the book its unusual literary
quality is the artistry with which the sub-plots are woven in a
sort of counterpoint story.
Take this passage on page 480:
Laundry Service 1960 1961 1962
Naval Academy $571,000 $612,000 $606,000
Search where he will in the 1040 pages, the reader will find no
comparable entry for the military academy. .. .Do the West Point Cadets
do their own laundry? Or do they send it home to mother?
Or look at page 17. In the Senate budget, the Vice-President and
the President Pro Tempore are allowed $9,000 each for an automobile.
In the House budget, the Speaker is allowed $10,000 for the same pur-
pose. And the majority and minority leaders get $19,000 each.
But now turn to page 49 and this entry:
Automobile for the Chief Justice $7,000. Why this discrimina-
tion?. .
.
It was in the 1920 s that Warren G. Harding, with the assistance
of his budget director, Charles G. Dawes bought out the first volume
in the ever-popular budget sequence. The world was simpler too.
How to live on $3,500,000 a year. But the two authors took 1,148
pages to tell it, just 108 more than the present volume.... 2
Further, the region of control will be explored. Does the execu-
tive control the budget and if he does control, how does he do it. Is
Congress actually in control? How effective is its ho'd on the national
purse strings? One authority says:
* 1962 Federal Budget in Brief , Bureau of the Budget, Executive
Office of the President, United States Government Printing Office,
Washington: 1961
17, 1961
2Wallace Carroll, Special Article to The New York Times, January

We must conclude then that the attempts of Congress to arm itself
with the machinery of retrospective control have altogether mis-
carried. Congress has not succeeded enough in devising a system of
procedure stringent enough to render efficacious. I say procedure,
for it seems clear that what is needed is not a new right, but a
prompt and searching remedy.
3
Is this 1943 view still valid in 1961?
The development of a philosophy of public budgeting has pro-
ceeded at a rather slow pace and has been consistent with our general
overall philosophy of government. Both the budget and the budget pro-
cess have followed in the wake of our changing conceptions of public
activities. As Harold Smith explains:
If a budget had existed as such 150 years ago, it would have been
a small budget, consistent with the precept that "that government is
best which governs least." But that conception no longer obtains.
We now seem to operate under the precept that "That government is
best which serves most; 1 ' or perhaps more accurately, Our government
must give much service if the country is to survive." Certainly
government today is a great service enterprise which not only gives
protection and care to individuals, but also undertakes to influence
the business cycle in such fashion as to minimize the impact upon
our citizens. The budget is the most accurate measure of the signi-
ficant transition in the responsibility of government.
My thoughts and conclusions are presented in a manner which will
review a brief history of the budget of the United States and the many
steps which the budget goes through from its conception until execution.
Students of budgeting may find this boring; I ask their indulgence; to
those who are not acquainted with the in's and out's I hope the following
chapters may prove most enlightening.
^Lucius Wilraerding, "The Spending Power" (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1943) p 308
Harold D. Smith, "The Budget in Transition " in "Budgeting:
an Instrument of Planning and Management", Catheryn Seckler-Hudson,
editor, (Washington: The American University, 1944) Unit 1, p 73

CHAPTER II
A HISTORY OF BUDGETING
The Beginning of a Financial System
Much controversary has raged and will continue to rage through
the years as to whether the budget should be adopted along lines of
"performance" or whether its present form is acceptable. What the
future form will assume only time will tell. In this paper a history
of the budget of the United States from 1777 to the present will be
sketched.
The articles of Confederation adopted in 1777 by the Continen-
tal Congress were ratified by all the states and completed in 1781.
Unfortunately struggles over the distribution of power between federa-
lism and localism started the breakdown of the Confederation. The ul-
timate breakdown was due not so much to the defects of the Articles as
to the psychological unreadiness of Americans to submit to outside con-
trol and to the "hard times" which made any government an adventure.
Inability to provide adequate revenues was one of the greatest failures
to the Confederation. The limitation of the taxing power left the
national government dependent upon requisitions from the several states,
Edmund Randolph proposed an amendment reading "Bills for raising money
^Samuel F. Morrison and Henry S. Coramager, "The Growth of the
American Republic ' , (New York, Oxford Press, 1950) p 259

5for 'be pur; '. , >r I t • r< ame, sbn riginate
in the Bouse of Rej I ; uad . cered by
Senate as to Incr _ Of diminish the sum to be raised, or change the
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mode of levying it, or of its appropriating." The Constitu-
tion may be ragarded as setting four qualifications regarding the exer-
ci.: | of . ': | spending power:
No appropriation in support of che Array shall run for longer
than two years.
2. No money shall be drawn from th .sury but in consequ--n'
of approprla ion.
A regular sta . and account of ali r udi-
tures rausf. be ed from " ,.iiae to time .
4. All -xpondir-ur :s shall be made for . .ieral we 1 far .
On 'hi' 17 .b I ptember in 1787 delegates from tlv . ft*
LIElag the Lralizailon, affixed tHftiY signature to rh->. Cons ti-
ll ion of d States of America. Financially, (ho first: problems
were the need for a national raone ary system and a national revenue sys-
tem. Alexander 'amiUon drafted the bill which established the Treasury
Department and submitted estimates of appropriations to Congress which
were not oven itemized. Appropriation action therefore was little more
4than a rubber stamp.
Albert Gallatin an active opponent of Alexander Hamilton was
continually agi'af. d by:
a) lump sum approprla ions
b) broad discretionary powers given to the President and the
Secretary of the Treasury
James Kadlsoft! "Journal of r/he Federal Convent- ion", *»dlte.d by
E. H. Scott (Ch Albert, Scott and Col, 1893) p 512
3tMnie! T. Seiko, "The Federal Financial System" (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1940) p A5
w'aul Studenski and Herman E. Krooss, "Financi .' .1. >ry of the
United Siates ". (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952)

6c > s$gs urn*
Geu.i- in earl) tfecoftniz d it of Con*
gressiona en t . In otttec to
tion on tha - finances" an
able, Congress, in 1600 required . y of tl , ..sury I :.it
an annua! report ;.o Congross. lint. .latin's fcneouraguraont, the House
w ys and Means Committee achiev ..ruanent , *nd uat
cn-ro.Lou appropriation bill* &-
ratary of tK Lea froa
...during ihiss period he conti;
ana at the ir ;Inninp of each session o£ Congress a Book of I as
setting for'h the
and agenc i . The Secretary's function was primarily clerictl. He
classified tl ;..o . . rasa.
He did not criticize, aHer, . .ordinate the requests.
The Members of this powerful coaamitt^ had beaten off ai' attempts
to cu: down heir authority until 1865, wh?n it was generally agreed by
all th " the load was too heavy. As a consequence in March 1865,
Hous> a its Commit tee on Appropriations which was then ap
h opening session of the following Con : . Thadu ub Stevens of
Pennsylvania was appointed the first chairman of the new commit:C*f which
consisted of members. Commit coe arrangements in B aral-
lelad those in cba House. In the upper chamber the Committee on Finane :
had b ned with U>:h raweniiM tod appropriations for store th.
seventy years. In 1867 aata followed the example of the . tf
5imu.. p 71
Jaa arkhead, ^ovor:.:. •-;
t
/'.
; . , (New York: John T*'i ley
and Sons, Inc., f<56) p 10,13

7and created a Committee on Appropriations to consist of seven members.
The Finance Committee has continued to this day to retain jurisdiction
over revenue measures.
Period of Laxity
An incentive to operate the finances so as to achieve greatest
economy simply did not exist during the period from the Civil War to the
1900*s. America was safe from attack from abroad and with no apparent
end to her weal'h of resources. The infant industries demanded protec-
tion which was provided in the form of high tariffs. This was the
period when the "financial problems" faced by Congress was the high
revenue brought in from these customs duties.
Among the more judicious acts of Congress during this period was
the passage of the Dockery Act in 1894, as a means of overhauling the
accounting and auditing system. The original accounting and auditing
procedures from the Treasury Act of 1789 created an Auditor and a Con-
troller. The Dockery Act established the Offices of the Controller and
an Assistant Controller of the Treasury and set up Auditors for the
following agencies: Treasury, War, Navy, Pos Gific^ and State Department.
Its redefinition of the duties of the Controller provided an
important step toward the present day budget process. The judicial
aspects of the offices were given emphasis while administrative func-
tions were removed; thus by confining the Controller's duties to "the
legal construction of cases, the law gave recognition to the judicial
work of that officer as his prime and almost exclusive duty."
7Darrel H. Smith, "The General Accounting Office". (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1927) p 43

8Although the provisions of the Act were numerous, most of them were
largely related to the details incident to the rearrangement of the
system of accounting and auditing by the department auditors. The
system set up by this act received no further revision until the Bud-
geting and Accounting Act of 1921.
Mention also should be made of the problem of deficiencies
in this period of history. The deficiency problem arose when execu-
tive agencies spent or obligated, in an early part of the appropria-
tion year, the bulk of their appropriations and then asked Congress
for more money. The denial of such requests would have resulted in
a national program grinding to a halt. In many of these recurrent
situations, it was not clear whether the administration offices had
deliberately incurred additional obligations or had genuinely found
the appropriations inadequate to meet the needs of operation. At any
Q
rate, the number of deficiency appropriations increased rapidly.
The so-called Anti-Deficiency Act of 1906 was a section of the Urgent
Deficiency Act which forbade administrative expenditures in excess of
appropriation unless the obligations was authorized by law and directed
the apportionment of funds by the agencies. The appropriations were
to be apportioned monthly to prevent expenditure in one portion of the
year of all funds which caused additional or supplementary appropria-
tions. The Act further directed that only the head of the department
could change the apportionment after it was once set up and that in
doing so he must communicate his reasons in writing to Congress. This
8Selko, op. cit., p 97

9practice remained operative until 1933 when the complete control of
apportionment was transferred to the Bureau of the Budget where it
remains today.
Until the establishment of the present budget system by the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Congress determined and guided,
insofar as possible, the details of the government financial system
with little or no assistance from the Chief Executive. His sole duty
was to approve or disapprove the bills as they came from Congress.
The House distributed the appropriation bills among several committees.
No one knew the total amount of the appropriations until the end of the
congressional sessions.
The government had become "one of standing committees; and the
representative, deliberative body as a whole could do little more than
approve their acts. In the federal government there were sixty one
committees in the House of Representatives, of which fourteen could
originate appropriation bills and seventy four in the senate, of which
fifteen could originate bills which carried charges against the Treasury,
working independently of one another and with no provisions for coordi-
9
nation or locating responsibility."
By 1910, the financial methods of the national government had
become so obviously defective and so open to political abuses that
steps were taken to correct them. In this year, President Taft appoint-
ed a Commission on Economy and Efficiency. After a searching investi-
gation, covering two years, this commission made several reports setting
forth its findings. The most important of these was the one entitled,
^Frederick A. Cleveland, "Popular Control of Government ",
Political Science Quarterly, June 1919, p 237
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"The Need for a National Budget" which the President submitted to the
Congress with his endorsement. He believed so strongly in the main
recommendation of this report, namely the formulation of the budget
by the President that he actually prepared "A Budget for the Fiscal
Year 1914" and submitted it to the Congress. It was coldly received
and practically ignored.
Although the work of the Taft Commission was neglected by Con-
gress, it had an immediate and telling effect on the state governments.
The work of the commission provided the initial impetus toward a coun-
try-wide movement for budgetary reform among the states. Within a
decade nearly every state government had provided for budgetary methods.
These states' experiments in budgeting were in the nature of laboratory
tests, which served to demonstrate the great need for a budget system
in the national government. Following the close of the first World War,
there was a strong popular demand for national budgetary reform, so much
so that Congress could not procrastinate any longer. After extended
hearings and debate, Congress finally passed a bill in June 1920. Presi-
dent Wilson vetoed this bill because of a certain restriction on his con-
stitutional prerogative. The next Congress passed almost an identical
bill and it was signed by Eresident Harding on June 10, 1921.
Establishment of the Present System
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was the result of years
of dissatisfaction with financial management and it placed full respon-
sibility upon the President for preparation of the budget. The act
Daniel Bell, ' The Function of the Cureau of the Budget " , in
George B. Roberts (editor), A Forum of Finance, Columbia University
Press, New York, 1940, p 59,60
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provided for two new establishments, a Bureau of the Budget within the
Treasury Department and a General *\ccounting Office "independent of the
executive department and under the control and direction of the Control-
ler General of the United States." 11
The new Bureau was headed by a Director and an Assistant Direc-
tor appointed by the President and serving at his pleasure. In making
the Director the "Presidents* man" there was assurance that at least the
initial stages of budget preparation would be controlled by the Presi-
dent. The Bureau was required to receive, assemble, revise and compile
the estimates of the various departments and agencies. In addition it
was charged with the supervision and control of budget administration.
This included the apportionment of appropriations, a function which had
been in the hands of department heads under the Anti-Deficiency Act of
1906. The Budget Bureau served as a staff agency to assist the Presi-
dent in achieving more efficient management and more economical conduct
of government business.
The Act further established the General Accounting Office,
headed by a Controller General and an Assistant Controller General who
were to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Reporting directly to the Congress, the General Accounting Of-
fice was given the general task of prescribing the government's finan-
cial accounting system and making final audits of all accounts. It was
also charged with making recommendations to Congress for improvement and
efficiency. Clearly the General Accounting Office was designed to work
in a unique relationship with the legislature. The Act placed it in a
UThe Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Section 301
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strategic position to serve that body in the investigation of administra-
tive expenditures. Its establishment laid out the base for a sound sys-
tem of audit. In talking about the need for an audit to control budget
spending, Professor Willowby said:
...I consider it a very important phase, that should go along
jointly with a proposal to vest in the President the formulation and
submission of a budget. The vesting of that power in the hands of
the President, as it should be, is certainly going to enormously in-
crease his power. I mean it will increase it effectively in the
government and it is going to increase it politically outside of the
government. And I think it is a cannon of correct administrative
organization and procedures that just in proportion as responsibility
is increased and powers enlarged, control should be correspondingly
strengthened.
The proposal to establish an independent department of accounts
with a controller entirely independent of the administrative branch
and reporting directly to Congress, gives the real responsible body,
Congress, power to go over and scrutinize in an independent way every
act of the administration and will furnish the means of control over
this enlarged power that the President would have. ^2
It Is interesting to note that during this period, Congress also
took action to improve the system of handling appropriation bills in
which all such bills were referred to the Committee on Appropriations.
This put an end to the diffusion of responsibility for the study of
appropriations among several committees. Revenue mo;asures continued to
be considered separately, while the rules which permitted individual
members to sponsor appropriation bills made overall control of finance
impossible. Unfortunately the use of "riders" resulted in the con-
tinuation of the practice of passing a mass of extraordinarly confusing
legislation.
Notwithstanding defects in the Act, for the first time the United
States could speak of a budget process comprising formulation by the
Hearings before the Committee on Consideration of a National
Budget, U.S. Senate, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, December 15, 1919, p 36
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executive, authorization by Congress, execution under the direction of
the President and an independent audit as a means of legislative review.
For more than a decade after the passage of the Budget and
Accounting Act, the budget indicated an emphasis on economy and effi-
ciency and the Budget Bureau functioned little more than an auxiliary
service agency. The economic crises of the thirty's, the extraordinary
measures undertaken to combat them, led to more thought and discussion
on the subject of the existing budget system. It became evident that
the national budget system was nearing the end of its adolescence and
was soon to take its place as one of the great instruments of adminis-
trative management. It was being perceived that efficiency in adminis-
trative management depended heavily upon firm lodging of responsibility
for financial management. Nor could fiscal policy succeed if budgetary
13
tools remained undeveloped and unused.
President Roosevelt's Reorganization Plan #1
In 1939, transfer of the Budget Bureau from the Treasury Depart-
ment to the Executive Office was effected under the authority of the
President's Reorganization Plan # One by Executive Order #8248 dated 8
September 1939. This was by no means a hasty decision but was an act
which had been built up by the experience that the nation had undergone
JJGeorge B. Galloway cites th~ function of modern fiscal policy
as being (1) the determination of the source, volume, and forms of public
revenues; (2) the determination of the scope and purposes of public ex-
penditures; (3) the use of the budget as a means of coordinating revenues
and expenditures; (4) the smoothing out of the inequalities of wealth in
the community to as to promote economic democracy; (5) the employment of
revenues and expenditures as instruments of economic and social policy.
George B. Galloway and Associates, "Planning for America", (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1941) p 617
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during an economic crises in which the absence of management was keenly
felt. The executive order established the following principal divisions
in the Executive Office: the White House Office, the Bureau of the Bud-
get, the National Resources Planning Board, the Liaison Office for Per-
sonnel Management, the Office of Government Reports and, in the event of
a national emergency or threat of a national emergency, such office for
emergency management as the President shall determine. ^
The Dur t B of the Budget is limited to overall financial planning
by the separation of the income and expenditure aspects of the budget for
the initiation and recommendation of revenue - income raising plans are
shared by the Treasury Department and the Congress itself as it t^orks
through such committees as the Joint Committee of Internal Revenue.
Despite this separation, the Bureau is capable of overall financial
planning, as it is charged with the responsibility of proposing spend-
ing programs in accordance with major policies of the government.
The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act, of 1950
The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 expressed the
intent of Congress that maintenance of accounting systems and develop-
ment of financial reports were the responsibility of the executive branch;
that emphasis should be placed on effecting orderly improvements toward
more effective financial management practice and that the Treasury De-
partment, the General Accounting Office and the Bureau of the Budget
should conduct a continuous program for the improvement of accounting
*-*The Federal Register , United States Government Printing Office,
September 12, 1936, p 3863
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and financial reporting.^ Public Law 863 was the major legislative
proposal of the budget and accounting recommendations of the Second
Hoover Commission. It covered nine of the Hoover recommendations, in-
cluding provisions for gradual conversion to a procedure under which
the Congress would appropriate funds in terms of "accrued expenditures,
the use of costs in accounting and budgeting in the executive agencies,
the improvement of agency allotment practices and the development of
consistency in financial and organization classification."
Summary ; The history of the budget (agency and process) has been brief-
ly noted. In the beginning, the executive branch under the influence
of Alexander Hamilton exerted the strongest influence in financial mat-
ters. In a few years the pendulium had swung in the opposite direction
so that Congress exerted the strongest influence in financial matters.
Today the pendulium has centered - the executive department formulates
and executes while the Congress approves or disapproves. The control
of the purse is shared equally by the executive and legislative branches
of government. The budget and Accounting Act of 1921 is considered a
milestone for sound financial management of the United States.
^improvement of Financial Management in the Federal Government
,






FROM CONCEPTION TO EXECUTIG1 - E EXECUTIVE END
Mechanics of the Navy Pudge
t
At this rime the mechanics of budgeting, how ; he document is
passed from official to official, deportment to department and from one
branch of government to the other will be presented. The mechanics
differ in each department of government depending on the size and accom-
plishments of the departments. No department can handle its respective
budget exactly as another department and this is as it should be. As
the Department of Defense spends the largest amount of each dollar al-
loted to the government, approximately 42 billion for fiscal '62, an
examination of how the budget moves in this department will be discussed.
In particular the Navy's part of the Department of Defense's budget will
be outlined. Th« dollar amount of the Navy budget is approximately 12
billion dollars.
A budget is a financial plan, a plan of how the Navy Department
hopes to operate eighteen months hence, as the conception time is eigh-
teen months prior to execution time. Where does the Navy budge teer
start? What generates the ideas on how the Navy will form the budget?
These ideas must emanate from some person or organization. In the Navy's
case, ideas or guidance come from two sources: outside the Navy Depart-




Guidance from outside the Navy Department are from the Commander-
in-Chief, the President, and from the Secretary of Defense.
In providing guidance to the Secretary of Defense, the President,
of course, relies heavily for advice on his immediate staff agencies
and other groups established to assist In the formulation of policy.
Among the more of these for budget purpose are the Bureau of Budget,
the Council of Economic Advisors, and the National Security Council.
Presidential guidance which usually covers broad areas such as fis-
cal policy, economic assumptions and the general level of the. mili-
tary effort, is usually transmitted to the Secretary of Defense....
The Secretary of Defense, in ^.urn, provides military and fiscal
guidance to the Navy. Based on the recommendations of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, for example, he provides the Navy with approved
military programs such as force levels and personnel strength. In
addition, he provides the fiscal ground rules to be followed in pre-
paring the budget. The amount of direction and guidance received
from higher levels varies from year to year depending on many con-
siderations such as the internal situation, the economic outlook,
and changes in administration. Very often, guidance is received
piecemeal during the budget formulation rather than at the beginning
when, from an ideal viewpoint, it is most needed....
Within the Department of the Navy, this general guidance is
translated into annual Program Objectives, and serves as the. base for
Navy budget estimates. The Program Objectives have been defined by the
Chief of Naval Operations as "definitive statements of requirements."
A requirement is
an expression of a specific demand generated by a strategic plan
or strategic concept for products, services or resources. To be
useful in budgetary calculations, a requirement must be attainable
within reasonable and realistic limits, production and cost. J
The Chief of Naval Operations has prescribed procedures for the
preparation of the Department of the Navy Program Objectives. He (Chief
i
United States Department of the Navy, The Budget Process in the
Navy , Office of the Comptroller, June 1960, p 3-3
2United States Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations
.




of Naval Operations) designates program sponsors and program coordinators.
Representatives of the Program sponsors are designated as permanent
working groups acting at a staff level for the liaison with the program
4
managers to the bureaus. These Program Objectives are submitted after
review and approval by the CAB, (Chief of Naval Operations Advisory
Board consisting of top military personnel of the Navy Department), to
the Chief of Naval Operations for approval and then forwarded to the
Secretary of the Navy for his approval.
After the Program Objectives have been announced, NAVCOMPT (Of-
fice of the Navy Comptroller) issues the "call for estimates" to those
offices responsible for developing budget estimates to support the Pro-
gram Objectives. This "budget call" provides the necessary guidance to
those offices responsible for the preparation, justification and sub-
mission of budget estimates.
The Office of the Navy Comptroller directive (NAVCOMPT Instruc-
tion 7102.1 of 3 November I960, Office of the Navy Comptroller) Subj
:
Budget exhibits and formats; Instruction for the preparation of,)
specifies that the content of the budget submissions be prepared in
four parts:
(1) Jusiif ication Material. This is prepared by account and
assembled in sets for presentation in bound loose- leaf volumes. In-
structions for preparing this material are so specific that the struc*
ture, accounts, organization and assembly are spelled out in minute
detail
.
(2) Annex material. This consists of additional volumes for
each component organizations, containing specified exhibits of sup-
porting data for use primarily by the Office of the Navy Comptroller.
The estimate detail than does the justification material.
(3) Back-up data. This data is prescribed by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and is assembled into sets by
accounts to accompany and support the justification material in the
Department of Defense review.
Schedules. These are prescribed by the Bureau of the Budget and
are used as support material by the Bureau of the Budget examiners




After the budget review estimates are put into specified format
by the preparing bureaus and offices, they are forwarded to the Of-
fice of the Navy Comptroller where the formal review process starts.
^
...that budget proposed by individual activities in the shore
establishment and operating forces have been given a thorough goin -
over by the chain of command enroute to the appropriate management
bureau. This is particularly true of capital expenditure proposals.
Furthermore, approval of a proposal by all levels up to the manage-
ment bureau level is no guarantee that the request will be included
in the bureau's budget. Within the bureau, proposals are subject
to a close scrunity to insure they are consistent with the bureau's
objectives and goals which have been based on the overall planning
objective."
The review of the estimates in thr Office of the Comptroller
takes several weeks in which hearings, meetings and discussions take
place. At the end of this period "mark-ups" (proposed revisions of the
submitted budget estimates) ar- prepared which are based on information
accumulated during the above mentioned hearings. These mark-ups are sent
to the various Navy Department bureaus, Office of Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, and Headquarters, Marine Corps. These revisions are reviewed by
the respective bureau and any areas of disagreement becomes the subject
of "reclama hearings." The "mark-up" budget including reclamas and
adjustments is submitted to the CAB, the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Secretary of the Navy for further review and final decision. ^ Th^ fine 1
authority and responsibility for the Department of Navy's budget is the
Secretary of the Navy. From the Secretary of the Navy's Office, the
budget is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.
Research Report of the 1961 Class, Navy Graduate Comptroller-
ship Program, "Performance "udpeting and Financial Management in the
Department of the Navy ," The George Washington University, Washington,




'Department of the Navy, The Budget Process in Navy, Office of
Comp: roller
.
October 1959, p 4-13
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Th."-. vavy budget at the Secretary of Defense Level
Because of the time factor, when the Navy budget is received in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, this office's review is usually
conducted jointly with members of the Bureau of the Budget. The staff
personnel of the Office of Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the
Budget work together and review is conducted mostly on an informal ba-
sis with some formal hearings. The Office of Secretary of Defense's
review is concerned with the validity of program requirements, pricing
and feasibility of programs and the relative priority of the programs
of the three military departments.
Upon completion of its review the Office of the Secretary of
Defense forwards its mark-up to the Navy for comment and reclama similar
to procedures when the Office of the Navy Comptroller forwarded its
mark-up to the various bureaus. 4s the bureaus were given an opportun-
ity to present their views so the Navy is given an opportunity to pre-
sent its view to the Secretary of Defense. Once the Secretary of De-
fense has heard the "reclamas" he makes his final decision and forwards
the budget to the bureau of the Budget.
9
The Navy Budget at the Budget Bureau Level
As the Bureau of the Budget and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense staff personnel usually conduct joint reviews of the budget when
received by the Department of Defense, it is difficult to say where the







The distinction between the two reviews rest primarily in the
fact that, while the two agencies are usually in agreement on the
funds required for the vast majoricy of items in the budget, the
Bureau of the Budget may not concur fully in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense mark-up. Likewise, it. may not concur fully
in actions taken by the Secretary of Defense on rec lamas. In
view of its position as a staff agency of the President, the Bureau
of the Budget naturally reserves the right to disagree with actions
taken while it is participating in the review with the Office of
Secretary of Defense.
Final decisions on the defense budget are, of course, made by
the President, who makes such after consultations with the. Bureau of
the Budget, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
National Securicy Councils and others.
When the president concurs with the figures presented, the bud-
get is printed and forwarded to the Congress which must be accomplished
within the first fifteen days of each regular session of the Congress.
Usually this takes place around the twentieth of January each year.
Summary : In these few pages an attempt is made to show the mechanical
steps which take place from the budget conception until it is presented
to Congress. Remember that approximately thirteen months have inter-
vened from conception to Congress. Mxh hard work has been put forth
and undoubtly much soul searching and auguish have been encountered.





FROM CONCEPTION TO EXECUTION - AT THE LEGISLATIVE END
Review by the Committees of Appropriation
Twelve to thirteen months have gone by, six months more will
elapse before Congress takes final action. By custom all appropria-
tion bills originate in the House of Representatives, where the re-
view begins. In both House and Senate, the Committee of Appropria-
tions conducts the review. To expedite business the Appropriations
Committee is broken down into subcommittees. The defense budget goes
before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations in
both House and Senate.
Justification in support of the budget is forwarded to the
subcommittee approximately threi to four weeks in advance of the hear-
ings so that the subcommittee staff may confer with various officials
in the Department of Defense to clarify points that may be raised
during the Congressional hearings.
At the beginning of the hearings, top officials of each main
bureau testify. These officials usually deal only with broad questions
of national policy. Following these hearings, the subcommittee com-
mences its hearings with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff ad other officials who explain the total defense program and
funds required to support it. Each service is also given an opportun-




the Navy, this is usually done by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief
of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The sub-
committee usually considers the individual appropriation requests in
the order in which they appear in the President's budget. The question-
ing of witnesses on each appropriation is usually preceeded by delivery
of two statements - one by the program sponser from the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations with respect to program requirements, the
other by the Chief of the Bureau involved with respect to funds requir-
ed to carry out the program. In addition they hear reports from the
members of the Budget Bureau and other interested persons who desire to
offer testimony. The full committee meets to consider the subcommittee
drafts and the subsequent bills are reported to the Hou
The House goes into the Committee of the '.Tiole House on the
State of the Union for debate and consideration of the appropriation
bills. The bills reported to the House may be amended on the House
floor before passage. However, the House usually approves the bills
in the form which the Committee of the Whole House has adopted them
and the bills are sent to the Senate.
The Senate refers the appropriation bills to its Committee on
Appropriations where subcommittees hold hearings again and listen to
additional testimony. The subcommittee requires the military depart-
ment to submit reciama statements on all items where there is dis-
agreement with action taken by the House. These rec lamas, which re-
present brief statements explaining what effect the House action would
The Budget Process in the Navy , Office of the Comptroller,
Department of the Navy, October 1959, p 5-5
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have on programs and the reasons for the requested reconsiderations by
tl ture f i ppeals. In other : the. interested
parties defeated in the House have another opportunity to present their
cases. The full committee considers the drafts of the subcommittee and
reports the bills to the Senate with or without amendments.
The Conf:j r"nc^ Honi'l
The Senate considers the bills in the form transmitted from the
ise together with the committee amendments. During he mate debate
and discussion concerning the bills, additional amendments may be pro-
posed from the floor of the Senate. -rally, the bills passed by
contain the same provisions as those passed by the
House. cause of this fact, the bill is forwarded to a conference
committer where the diff , s are resolved. The decision of the con-
ference committee is then reported to each House for a final no -.. When
both Houses hav a d upon a Conference c port, the ction
is complete and the enrolled bill Is sent to the Eresiden .
The Presidential Level
Upon receipt of the enrolled bill the President refers it to the
Budget nr^nu and the department concerned for recommendations respecting
his action. In many cases the original executive estimates have been
completely revised in their legislative passage, and the acceptance of
Congressional action would necessitate a substantial revision of pro-
grams. The. decisional action which esident must make is at times
a difficult one. He must accept or reject an entire bill without the
benefit of being able to strike out the objectionable features. The
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decision to veto an entire bill because of one objectionable part is not
a simple one. This is especially true when the enrolled bill reaches the
President at a time shortly before the beginning of the new fiscal year.
Upon the signature of the President, the bill becomes a law. The State
Department, as the custodian of the law, sends certified copies to the
Treasury Department.
Summary: The budget has moved through Congress, via the appropriations
committees and the conference committee, to the President for signature
to become the law of the land. The mechanics of budgeting are pretty




BUDGETING PROBLEMS IN THE CONGRESS
The Cm;:.: [ | -; Syg <•• a
As previously stated, this country has given precious little
attention to the management of its public functions. President
Roosevelt pointed out the necessity for continuous interest and
rainistrative study in his 1939 message to Congress.
...we must be constantly alert to the importance of keeping the
tools of American democracy up to date. It is our responsibil
to make sure that the people's government is in condition to carry
out the people's will, promptly, effectively, without waste or lost
motion. .. .we are not free if our administration is weak. But we
are free if we. know, and others know, that we arc strong; that we
can be tough as well as tender hearted and that what the American
people decide to do can and will be done, capably and effectively,
with the best national equipment that modern organizing ability
can supply in a country where management and organization is so
well understood in private affairs.
in the last few years there have been a number of studies of the
federal administration in the hope of securing greater efficiency in
management. The budget has been repeatedly pointed out as one of the
major areas for reorganization. It is shown that C>: nnjress is inadequate
properly to handle the vast load that the budget review presents.
Issues before Congress are gigantic. We as a nation cannot afford to
see the budgetary process weakened by the hesitancy of Congress to
revitalize its share in the process. Although, ihe President has the
Message to Congress transmitted the First Plan on Government




responsibility for the formulation of the budget, Congress must auth-
orize it. Because the budget is passed in the form of a number of ap-
propriation acts, it bears the imprint of the strongest groups repre-
sented in Congress. Thus a subsidy for agriculture must be passed at
the behest of a farm bloc, money for a new post office building as pro-
posed by an influential member of Congress and so the list grows.
Harold Smith stated the problem when he wrote that:
No budget system can eliminate all conflict in budgeting. Vari-
ous regional or economic groups in the population have different con-
cepts of the general welfare which their government is to serve.
These differences are reflected both in the lagislative and in the
executive branch. There is no scientific determination of the "pro-
per" content of a budget. Struggle and compromise is the very es-
sence of the democratic process and is necessarily reflected in the
budget. In the President s program, the problem of the nation as a
whole are focused. The budget process itself serves as a method to
channel and balance the conflicting views and to assure that what-
ever compromise is reached will be effectuated. A budget cannot be
measured by any mechanical rule, but only by its usefulness as an
adapted instrument of legislative control as well as of executive
management. The real test of a budget lies in its ultimate effec-
tiveness to carry out the will of the community.
2
To the extent that Congress works in a democratic manner, the bud-
get will truly reflect the general welfare of the people. As such, Con-
gress attitude and relationship to bhe budget is repeatedly under attack
by private and public studies. The committee system comes under great-
est attack - in particular, the committees dealing with appropriations
and revenues in both Houses are heavily criticized due to the senority
rule which deprives them of the opportunity of drawing the most capable
membership possible. Public finance can hardly receive adequate con-
sideration by committees composed of those whose major qualification is





of course, members of one party, it may be noted that there are times
when they come from only one section of the country. Until within re-
cent times, this arragement also meant heavy overrepresentation of the
farm bloc. This results sometimes in the interests of particular groups
receiving consideration out of proportion to their relation to the wel-
fare of the people as a whole.
In view of the enormously increased importance of the budget as
an economic and social instrument, it is essential to the general wel-
fare that the numerous diverse groups within the nation be properly re-
presented in the budget process. It has been suggested from time to
time that committee members be selected by other means and that the
practice of choosing committee chairmen by senorit.y be abandoned. Other
proposals have been recommendations for the consolidation of the revenue
and appropriations committees in each House; recommendations of joint
standing committees of both Houses. It appears that the principal ob-
jection in Congress to bills which would modernize present legislative
appropriating procedures, is that each contains structural or func-
tional elements which would require changes in traditional Congressional
procedures. Congressional rules, regulations and procedures are largely
governed by tradition. Each House, each committee, each subcommittee
(as well as each official, member and employee) jealously guards rights
and privileges and is likely to oppose any suggestion that might in-
fringe upon jurisdiction or prerogatives. The possibility of fewer
choice committee assignments led many Congressmen to give up very re-
luctantly, the system of the numerous committees existing before 1946.
The consolidation of some of the committees resulted in the abolition
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of those which were largely inactive but which had been previously
retained in the interests of the prestige of individual members or as
a means of creating committee assignments. With the enlargement of
the membership of the remaining committees and an increase in their
staffs, the members have more time to study the legislation before
them and have the opportunity to become better informed about the
problems of the day. After a successful effort had been made to block
the McCellan Bill, which had passed the Senate and which would have
strengthened Congressional facilities for handling the budget, Con-
gress did allow each of the two Appropriations Committees $250,000
for additional staff help and other similar purposes. The two com-
mitees have increased their staffs and have set up special investiga-
ting units. Each unit is under a Director of Studies and Investiga-
tions. The staff of each unit may be increased temporarily in
accordance with additional needs. Froblems which need further in-
vestigation are referred to these units.
The proposals for joint committees on appropriations and
revenues are no less controversial . There is again the matter of
decreasing the number of chairmanships - prospects alarming to many
Congressmen. Other and more reasonable criticisms of these proposals
have been that a joint committee might be overworked or that such a
committee would rank all others in strength and prestige and could
become the most powerful group in the House. The suggestion for a
joint appropriation and revenue committee, whatever else may be said
of them, plainly set forth one great objective: the union of both
the appropriation and revenue sides of the budget. The lack of such
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union has been one of the persistent faults of the budget process.
Joint consideration of income and expenditure could permit Congress
to tie-in the expenditures more closely with the government's income.
Further it would give the budget more real meaning in the sense of its
portraying a comprehensive picture of the government's finance.
The Problem of Trained Committ.ee Staffs
An added obstacle to the thorough treatment of budgetary matters
is the lack of trained committees staffs. The absence of skilled
assistants means that the fate of the administration's budget proposals
depend upon committees which not only fail to contain the most capable
members of Congress, but which are also deprived of expert assisted
which could provide them (eOfmlttees) with the information and research
3
vital to a thorough consideration of the budget proposals. It is im-
possible for members of these committees to examine properly the thou-
sands of items presented in the budget, or to determine the real justi-
fications for the funds requested. In view of other tremendously heavy
legislative responsibilities, the members of these committees do not
have the time personally to study each item of the budget and to get
the facts and information to pass judgment. Nor do they have adequate
means of obtaining guidance and assistance to enable them to perform
the vital functions expected of them.
Another serious problem is the lack of coordination between the
committees handling authorizations (substantive legislation) and those
handling appropriations. As an example of this lack of coordination -
'Arthur N. Macmahon " Congressional Oversight of Expenditures , 1
Political Science Quarterly, June and September, 1943
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let us imagine that a bill is introduced to authorize the construction
of a new dam. The authorization may include a relatively small sum for
planning, or it may not mention any do 1 tar figure at all. The argument
is made in Congress that the sum authorized (if any) is small, and that,
as a matter of fact the authorization bill itself doesn't grant the
power to spend a single penny - after all the appropriations committees
will review that. On the basis of these arguments, the authorization
bill is passed. When the time comes to appropriate the first year's
funds the. appropriation committee is to>d that Congress approved tbe
project and that the appropriation c remittee should grant the money.
Let us carry this imagination one step further - a first year appropria-
tion f>r a small amount is passed. The following year, a new request
comes in for many millions. A strong case is rv.do that the project is
under way and that it would be wasteful and inefficient to stop it mid-
way in Lti construction. Only a sirong-wil led appropriations committee
will be deaf to such an argument.
Congress might also find it advisable to reconsider the form
which the appropriation measures take. The interests of efficient
administration are severly handicapped by the prevalent notion that
broad appropriation acts would destroy 'egislative control of the bud-
get. Itemized appropriations handcuff the day-to-day management of
the administrative agencies to details which frequently makes more work
than useful information.
the details of the business of government have escaped the com-
petence of legislative committees and chairmen; the possibility of de-
ciding policy by settling details, once perhaps feasible, has disap-
peared; in the future, legislatures per force must deal with adminis-
tration on the basis of principle and generality if they are to deal
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with it effectively and in the public interest*
Is it not possible to entrust to executive management the de-
tailed operations and execution of the will of Congress and at the
same time strengthen the Congressional methods of checking upcn these
operations? The experiences vhich Congress has had with the executive
management of broad appropriations during the early days of the Repub-
lic and the emergency period of the thirties have demonstrated that
such executive responsibility can be highly satisfactory. Legislative
control can be exercised by other means that specifying many months in
advance what grade the clerks will have in a particular office. Legis-
lative control, properly exercised, means the control of objectives arid
of policies. A deliberative body is not properly fitted to direct de-
tailed administrative management. Thif> is he area of executive manage-
ment.
The most important function which Congress can perform in the
budget process is to relate the budget to the general welfare. This is
a policy-making function and it points to Congress as the most demo-
cratic means of insuring that the budget objectives are in accordance
with the nation's basic economic and social philosophy.
Summary : Some of the problems that Congress encounters with the budget
have been reviewed - the traditional rules which Congress guard so
jealously but which restrict the best qualified men from serving on the
appropriations committees; how interest of particular groups receiving
consideration out of proportion to their relation to the welfare of the
Leonard D. Shite "Legislative Res;>nnsibi i ity for the Public
Service ", New Horizons in Public Administration, University of Alabama
Press, Alabama, 1945, p 6
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people as a whole and the problem of the lack of trained committee
staffs.
It is hoped that Congress will reform its own procedures just
as it passes other legislation -- largely in response to public demand.
Certainly the basis upon which decisions are made authorizing the
spending of federal money contributed by taxpayers is of vital impor' ance
to all of us, but as indicated in the introduction -- too many are only




A FEW THOUGHTS ON THE PERFORMANCE BUDGET
What is the Performa tc ad
The Hoover Commission in 1949 asked fof "a budget based on
functions, activities and projects. . .which would focus attention
upon the general character and relative important ;:he work to be
done, or upon the service to be rendered, rather than upon the things
to be acquired, .^uch as personal service, supplies, equipment and so
on. . . :he al 1- important thing in budgeting is the work or the servic
to be accomplished and what the work or service will cos - . This
touched off the many debates and arguments concerning the performance
budget. Jus!.: what is this thing called a performance budget? Secklar-
PJudson c .ncluded that functional activity and program budgeting are
all the same thing. On the other hand, Burkhead states "there is no
precise definition for performance budgeting; it has come to mean sorae-
thing different in every jurisdiction which puts it into operation."
As pointed cut in the previous chapter, each department lays
out a budget based on legislation and guidance provided by the
\
s Congress of the Commission on Organization of i. he
Executive Branch of h: Government , Volume 4, Budgeting and Accounting
^Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, ' Performance Budgeting in Government ",
Advanced Maaagemenl ("arch 1953) p 5
^Jesse Burkhead, "Governmen; 7'udee t ing '' , (Nev York: John Wiley




Executive Office. In the Congressional review and also the Budget Bureau
review, those reviewing should be interested if the undertakings are
essential to the government's overall program and if these undertakings
are the most efficient and economical. This is impossible today under
the present set up and points up the need for a program or performance
type budget.
At the present time two budgets are actually prepared, the ex-
penditure or cash budget and the obligation or administrative budget.
However, both of these relate only to actions to be taken in the
next fiscal year. In the case of the expenditure budget, his pro-
vides the basis for cash payments which must bo anticipated in the
ensuing year and are therefor« the basis for the revenue bill that
must be enacted. However, this beclouds the obligation picture
since it picks up obligations from prior years as well as the cash
portion of the obligations to be incurred in the next fiscal y
Similarily, the obligation authority budget projects the obligation
to be entered into in the fiscal year covered without reference to
the time at which these will mean expenditures.^
A performance classification differs from other classifications.
The intent of a performance classification is to assure that the thin
bought by a government are no longer to be counted or classified solely
by type, but are to be organized and aggregated according to the activi-
ties they serve. Objects bought and used are viewed as activity factors
or components, and the object is deemed significant and classified in
relation to what it is used for, not in relation to its specific
character.-*
The Froblem of the Performance Classification or Unit
But how can one pick a performance unit that is applicable to
n)avid Novick, "Which Programs Do we Mean in Program Budgeting?",
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 1954, p 19
5Jesse Burkhead, "Government Budgeting", (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., London Chapman and Hall, Limited, 1956) p 140
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all facets of the government? What is valid for one department will no"
be valid for another, and when Congress reviews the budget as a whole
can it tell what was exactly done, and whether it was done efficiently
if too many performance units were inserted in the budget as a measuring
stick. Performance classification in terms of Activities will provide
a great deal of information about "what government is doing"; will center
managements attention on programs and should help to make management
cost-conscious? Activit3/ classification can be refined to great detail
if this is desired. Refinement, however, runs the risk of obscuri.
the major outlines of an agency program and of transforming budgeting
to a detailed exercise in accounting. But Congress is interested in
dollars and cents of the taxpayers money and although they should recog-
nize performance classification as an aid to management, it is not an
aid to Congress directly, although it may be a great indirect aid.
Perhaps a solution wou'd be to present to Congress the budget
in two forms - one, its present form showing object spending and two,
the same figures presented in a performance scale.
Each department could then use a performance classification most
meaningful to its particular type of operation and Congress can examine
the budget in question from two viewpoints - one, the agency view, and
the other, the taxpayer view, who is interested in how much money is
spent for what, rather than for what it does. For the more discrimi;j_
voter who is interested in what the money dees, the perfornance classifi-
cation will be available to him.
Jesse Burkhead, "Government Budgeting" , (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., London- Chapman and Hall, Limited, 1956) p 144
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To accomplish the above presupposes that Congress has adequate
time to study the budget submitted from an object view as well as a
performance view. Unfortunately the five or six months that the budget
is in the hands of Congress is not enough time for such an adequate and
thorough review. It would appear that the ?v*ryday items of the budget
should be reviewed every other year, while budget items such as capital
improvement should be reviewed in the six months prior to the fiscal
year as is now the case. As such, Operations and Maintenance sections
of the Navy budget would be reviewed every other year, while the Mili-
tary Construction Section would be reviewed in the six months prior to
the fiscal ye-r.
Summary : The proposals stated were that the obligation budget be con-
tinuously projected and translated into an expenditure budget, that
more time be allowed to Congress for review and if possible the review
be made for the everyday expenditures on a two year basis while the




A review of the budget process from conception to execution
points up many weaknesses. These have been outlined many times by
others for it is much easier to criticize than it is to correct. There
is no simple easy road to economy and efficiency in the government or
to the control of federal expenditures. There are too many seekers of
federal favors, but too few who realize the soundness of the warnings
of President Roosevelt to the dangers of weak management practices.
It has long been suggested that the methods by which Congress does
business are often inadequate to handle the vast load of the present
day.
Students of public affairs have consistently reminded Congress
that legislative inefficiency impairs its relationship with both the
executive branch and the public. Even in the face of a rather per-
sistent Congressional minority, the executive branch has been able to
reorganize its activities from time-to-time in order to adjust to
changing demands of the people. Congress, on the other hand, has not
been readily inclined to revise its own methods. It is interesting
to note that when in June 1916 a bill to reorganize Congressional
machinery was being considered in the Senate, the upper chamber took
favorable action only after a strong bloc had been successful in de-




handle legislative employees and thus eliminate the patronage system.
Such opposition was not unusual, for almost all the plans looking to-
wards Congressional reorganization have felt the temper of small
minorities bent on protecting some small area of operation.
The President and his executive branch chart our national cours?.
This job is so big and so complex that Congress has never found a way
to organize to handle it and probably never will. Congress reviews,
to the extent possible, the proposed actions of the executive and makes
necessary changes before allowing the executive branch to proceed. The
aim of the review is to consider the main objectives, but details are
considered some to an unwarranted extent. Regardless of the general
efficiency of the review and the ability of the reviewers', the know-
ledge that any detailed point is subject to examination makes for more
careful work. The aim of this thesis has been to emphasize that the
Federal Budget is the instrument whicn makes the dreams of the American
people a reality. It is the Federal Budget which applies a yardstick to
this reality. It is imperative that we examine this document for the
information it contains and that we constantly endeavor to find ways
and methods for improvement. This is an ever-ending job; in some in-
stances a disagreeable one, but one which must be carried out if we are
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